56.6% of respondents have downloaded the government bitcoin wallet; among them 62.9% has never used it or only once whereas 36.3% uses bitcoin at least once a month. So, that would be enabling us to (a) have to have one that makes the force close bring the fees, and (b) to have zero fees on the commitment transactions themselves. Basically, I think there’s some basic agreement on this line that we’re shooting for with package relay, https://youtu.be/Lm-qxrDZ2hw v3, and ephemeral anchors, where the commitment transaction can get a very nice cleanup and improvement and kind of confirmation requirements, while the rest, there’s still some pinning vectors beyond that with HTLC transactions. The spender can then later demonstrate that the payment committed to that text and that it would’ve been computationally infeasible for that commitment to have been made without the cooperation of the receiver. The chosen assumptions have been chosen in such a way that they can be considered to be both intuitive and conservative, based on information of actual mining operations. I was looking through the notes and I don’t know if we want to get into the details of each one of these, but some things that stuck out to me from the notes were, "In what way does it not fit LN as it’s currently designe

And we’ve always gone back and forth between those, because we don’t know if we should do a simpler version first and wait for later to do a much more complex version, or if we should just jump to the more complex version right now. There’s no serialization format, and there’s strong recommendations against not doing this, right? It’s also just a life headache, but it’s a judgment call, because right now, LN kind of works on firm handshakes, nobody’s attacking each other, nobody’s doing channel jamming, but that could all change overnight. I’m not sure what the consensus is right now. Maybe it’s a little too many steps back, but I don’t think we see a ton of pinning on the network right now. Granted, all that real-worlding and road-hitting is a little hard to visualize just now. I think we’re going to stick to a simple version, where you allow pointing to any type of output to pay for your channel. LN relies on the penalty a lot to kind of enforce good behavior, when I think it’s not as necessary in this imagined future with an im
mempool.

So, these are kind of maybe big picture questions about how LN moves forward relative to some of these proposals that we’ve been talking about. So, I think we are not going to do that in the short term. And if mempool stays full with a very high feerate for a few months, then there’s an incentive to start attacking, and I think we should be ready for that before it happens. 16257 aborts adding funds to an unsigned transaction if its feerate is above the maximum amount set by the maxtxfee configuration option (default: 0.1 BTC). 2858 limits the maximum number of pending HTLCs in each direction to 30 (down from the maximum 483 allowed by the LN specification) and makes the value configurable with a --max-concurrent-htlcs option. The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge. It’s, I would say, in the garden-path case, where the nice case where your counterparty just went offline and won’t talk to you anymore, it would become more expensive to resolve these HTLCs in an unpinnable way. So basically, it’s kind of a trade-off between the case where your channel partner falls over versus they’re trying to pin you
eal your funds.

Maybe, instagibbs, you can kind of talk to that a bit. Greg Sanders: Yeah, I can speak to that a bit. We’ve talked a bit about some of these in our Waiting for confirmation series the last couple of months. We had a great podcast out in the Chaincode podcast, where we talked to Elle Mouton and Oliver Gugger about simple taproot channels, which basically is this proposal. Check out Abra’s illustrated explainer guide about Bitcoin’s past, present, and future: Code meets money: The match that made bitcoin. It is also confirmed that the very first version of the source code is heavily modified and many of the original comments have been removed. But the question is, when do you do a first cut, right? Greg Sanders: Well, with penalties, maybe it’s less of a problem, but also pinning is a problem in lots of other scenarios too, Discreet Log Contracts (DLCs), any sort of time-sensitive contract, right?